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Abstract
We study an auction that maximizes the expected social surplus under an upper-
bound constraint on the seller’s expected revenue, which we call a revenue cap. Such
a constrained-efficient auction may arise, for example, when: (i) the auction designer
is “pro-buyer”, that is, he maximizes the weighted sum of the buyers’ and seller’s
auction payoffs, where the weight for the buyers is greater than that for the seller; (ii)
the auction designer maximizes the (unweighted) total surplus in a multi-unit auction
in which the number of units the seller owns is private information; or (iii) multiple
sellers compete to attract buyers before the auction. We characterize the mechanisms
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for constrained-efficient auctions and identify their important properties. First, the
seller sets no reserve price and sells the good for sure. Second, with a nontrivial
revenue cap, “bunching” is necessary. Finally, with a sufficiently severe revenue cap,
the constrained-efficient auction has a bid cap, so that bunching occurs at least “at the
top,” that is, “no distortion at the top” fails.
1 Introduction
We consider a single-object auction in which buyers have independent and private values. In
the literature on the theory of auction design, much of the research focuses on auctions in
which the designer’s objective is a total surplus, revenue, or a convex combination of both.
Under a standard “regularity” condition,1 the designer’s maximization problem reduces to
unconstrained maximization of the expected virtual surplus and the solution is obtained by
pointwise maximization. These objectives can be considered as weakly “pro-seller”, because
the designer essentially maximizes a weighted sum of the buyers’ payoffs (their total values
minus revenue) and the seller’s payoffs (revenue), where the weight for the seller is weakly
greater than that for the buyers.
In this paper, we consider the converse objective of the designer, which we believe is
equally important. Namely, the auction designer is “pro-buyer” in the sense that his objective
is a weighted sum of the buyers’ and seller’s payoffs where the weight for the seller is smaller :
equivalently, his objective is a weighted sum of the total surplus and the revenue, where the
weight for the revenue is negative.2 Using the standard argument, we show that a similar
mathematical problem also arises when the designer maximizes the total surplus under an
upper-bound constraint for the seller’s revenue, which we call a “revenue cap”.3 Similarly,
1For example, the monotone virtual value condition in Myerson (1981).
2The extreme case is the maximization of the buyers’ payoffs. McAfee and McMillan (1992) show that
random allocation maximizes the buyers’ payoffs in the presence of cartels.
3The same problem arises when the designer minimizes the revenue under a lower-bound constraint for
the total surplus. This is also an interesting problem in some economic environments, for example, in which
the government wants to avoid collecting large revenue from an auction while guaranteeing a certain level of
social efficiency.
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this problem is converted to another problem with a revenue-maximizing designer, if buyers
have outside options at the ex ante stage as long as those outside options are significant.
To sum, we analyze three kinds of problems which are essentially equivalent to one another:
Maximization of the “pro-buyer” objective, maximization of the total surplus under the
revenue-cap constraint, and maximization of the revenue when buyers have significant outside
options.
The pro-buyer objective is reasonable, for example, if the auction designer is a social plan-
ner who tends to choose pro-consumer policies for political reasons, as discussed by Baron
and Myerson (1982) and Baron (1988), in the context of the regulation of a monopolistic
firm.4 Even if the weights are potentially the same, the designer’s problem may be repre-
sented in the same manner if there are some transaction costs for payments from buyers to
the seller. For example, Caillaud et al. (1988) and Laffont and Tirole (1986) consider a situ-
ation in which the government, in regulating a monopolist, in principle aims to maximize the
sum of the consumer surplus and the producer surplus, but the transaction costs distort the
weights, which are higher for the consumers.5 The designer also takes a pro-buyer objective
when the marginal utility of money is greater for buyers than for the seller.6 For example, a
buyer may have more investment opportunities than the seller but face a liquidity problem,
and hence the buyer’s value of keeping money at hand is higher than the seller’s.
Closely related, our “revenue cap” formulation is also relevant to the seller’s incentive
problem.7 An important example is a multi-unit auction in which the number of units owned
4Besley and Coate (2003) report empirical evidence showing that regulators are more likely to choose
pro-consumer policies if they are elected.
5Engel et al. (2013) discuss public–private partnerships in which such transaction costs exist, as well as
another source of the smaller weight for the producer surplus; if the social planner is the government of a
country, the planner may be in favor of consumers because producers are often firms from other countries.
6DeMarzo and Duffie (1999) analyze a security design problem in which the issuer’s discount rate is higher
than the market rate because of credit constraints.
7This formulation of the revenue cap is also related to the price cap in the context of the regulation of a
monopolistic firm. Armstrong et al. (1995) analyze the expected-revenue regulation when non-linear pricing
is allowed. Since they consider divisible goods mainly with a convex cost function, the firm increases the
quantity of the production to fulfill the cap. In our model, the good is indivisible and such manipulation
of the quantity of goods is impossible. See Armstrong and Sappington (2007) for a survey of the optimal
regulation of a monopolist.
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by the seller is private information. Suppose that the seller has two units of homogeneous
objects and there are two buyers, each of whom demands at most one unit. An efficient
mechanism allocates one unit for each buyer, which yields zero revenue with probability one.
Thus, the seller is better off by throwing away one unit and pretending to have just one unit
for sale. Given this incentive concern, the surplus-maximizing designer needs to modify the
auction mechanism by decreasing the expected revenue in the single-unit auction, and/or
increasing the expected revenue in the two-unit auction. More specifically, a constrained-
efficient auction mechanism is characterized by R ∈ R+ such that: (i) it maximizes the
expected surplus subject to revenue cap R with a single unit; and (ii) it maximizes the
expected surplus subject to “revenue floor” R with two units. Since problem (ii) can be
solved using the standard approach (such as in Myerson (1981)), we concentrate on problem
(i) here. We formally discuss this multi-unit auction problem in Section 4.1.
Finally, even if an auction mechanism is designed by a revenue-maximizing seller, if buyers
have outside options at the ex ante stage, and if those outside options are significant, then the
seller’s problem can be rewritten as a maximization of a weighted sum of the buyers’ payoffs
and revenue, where the revenue has a smaller weight. For example, such ex ante outside
options may be relevant when there are multiple sellers competing to attract buyers.8
On the basis of the standard envelope conditions, the expected revenue can be represented
as the expected virtual surplus. Therefore, our problem with a “revenue cap” reduces to
the maximization of the expected surplus minus (a positive constant weight times) the
expected virtual surplus subject to the standard monotonicity constraints and the revenue-
cap constraint. This weight for the virtual surplus is uniquely determined by the given
revenue cap. Constrained-efficient mechanisms given a negative weight for the virtual surplus
have very different properties to those in the standard case with a positive weight. First, the
above weighted sum is positive for all types, which implies that the seller always sells the
object. This contrasts with the standard revenue-maximizing auction with a reserve price,
8Peters and Severinov (1997, Section 3) study competition among sellers offering second-price auctions
with reserve prices in which each buyer chooses a seller at the ex ante stage (i.e., before knowing his value).
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in which no buyer obtains the object if every buyer’s value is lower than the reserve price.
Second, with a nontrivial revenue cap, bunching is necessary. To provide some intuition,
consider the designer’s maximization of expected total surplus under a constraint whereby the
seller’s expected revenue does not exceed R, where R is strictly between 0 and the expected
revenue in a second-price auction. Suppose, contrarily, that the above weighted sum is
nondecreasing in each buyer’s value. Then, as in the standard case in the literature, the
solution is obtained by pointwise maximization, and in the current case we obtain a second-
price auction. However, this contradicts the revenue-cap constraint. This means that with
a nontrivial revenue cap, the above weighted sum cannot be nondecreasing in each buyer’s
value everywhere, and therefore monotonicity constraints must be binding somewhere.
Third, although the exact location for bunching depends on the shape of the value distri-
bution, we show that if the revenue-cap constraint is sufficiently severe, then bunching must
occur (at least) “at the top”. As we see later, this essentially means that the constrained-
efficient auction mechanism has a “bid cap”, that is, the highest possible bid for each bidder
is strictly less than his highest possible value. Obviously, such a bid cap lowers efficiency,
but nevertheless it effectively constrains revenue.
The third property is of interest for the following reasons. First, it contrasts with the
standard auction with a positive weight, which generally exhibits “no distortion at the top”.9
Our result shows that if the designer is sufficiently pro-buyer, then this well-known result
no longer holds. Second, it has an important policy implication. Although a bid cap is
often imposed in auctions in practice, such as in public procurement (Decarolis, 2009; Ishii,
2008; Eun, 2017) and in online auctions,10 the standard approach (where “no distortion at
the top” robustly holds) fails to provide a rationale for such a policy.11 Our result provides
9For this terminology in a principal-agent model, see Fudenberg and Tirole (1991).
10For example, “Buy It Now” options in eBay, which provides services in many countries such as in the
US, and “Buy Now” options in Yahoo auction, which provides services in several countries such as in Japan.
11Budish and Takeyama (2001) and Reynolds and Wooders (2009) show that adding a “Buy It Now” option
can raise expected revenue when bidders are risk-averse. Mathews (2004) considers a dynamic environment,
and shows that a “Buy It Now” option is useful for extracting rent from impatient buyers. Kirkegaard and
Overgaard (2008) consider an alternative dynamic environment with multiple sellers, and show that an early
seller has an incentive to use a “Buy It Now” option to avoid competition with late sellers.
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a rationale by showing a logical connection between a revenue cap, which represents the
degree to which the designer is pro-buyer, and a bid cap, which is a specific constraint on
the auction rule. Finally, it suggests one of the potential reasons why auctions with “Buy It
Now” options have become popular in online auction environments such as eBay and Yahoo
auction. For example, Anderson et al. (2008) and Reynolds and Wooders (2009) report that
approximately 30–40% of eBay auctions in their data sets employ a “Buy It Now” option.
Our result suggests that under harsh competition among multiple sellers to attract buyers,
a seller may prefer to use “pro-buyer” auction formats that involve bid-capping.
From a broader point of view, our paper contributes to the line of research that explores
how the policy favorable to a certain group in the economy affects the incentives of the
agents. We can say that this paper also contributes in this respect.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce our
model. In Section 3, we present our main results. We consider two applications in Section 4:
a multiple-unit auction and ex ante competition among sellers.
2 Model
We consider a single-unit auction with independent and private values, except in Section 4,
where we consider a multi-unit auction (Section 4.1) and a simple competing auction envi-
ronment (Section 4.2). A seller owns an indivisible object (valueless for the seller), and n
(≥ 2) buyers potentially wish to buy it. Let N = {1, 2, . . . , n} denote the set of buyers.
For each buyer i ∈ N , his value vi of the object is independently and identically dis-
tributed according to a cumulative distribution function F over [0, 1].12 We assume that this
distribution is associated with a positive and continuously differentiable density function f
on [0, 1]. Let ψ(x) = x − 1−F (x)
f(x)
be the virtual value function. We denote a typical value
profile by v = (v1, . . . , vn) ∈ [0, 1]n, and for each i ∈ N , let v−i be the profile of the other
buyers’ values.
12Our results can be generalized to the case with asymmetric distributions across agents.
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Each buyer i ∈ N has a quasi-linear payoff function: if he obtains the object with
probability qi ∈ [0, 1] and makes a monetary transfer ti ∈ R, then his payoff is qivi− ti. The
seller’s payoff is revenue
∑
i∈N ti.
A (direct) auction mechanism (or a mechanism) (q, t) = (qi, ti)i∈N comprises an assign-
ment function q : [0, 1]n → [0, 1]n satisfying ∑i∈N qi(v) ≤ 1 for all v ∈ [0, 1]n,13 and a trans-
fer function t : [0, 1]n → Rn. An assignment function is symmetric if for all permutations
σ : N → N , each i ∈ N and each v ∈ [0, 1]n, qi(vσ(1), . . . , vσ(n)) = qσ(i)(v). For each i ∈ N ,
given that the other agents report truthfully, we denote the interim probability of winning
the object by Qi(vi) = Ev−i
[
qi(vi, v−i)
]
, and the interim transfer by Ti(vi) = Ev−i
[
ti(vi, v−i)
]
,
where Ev−i [·] denotes the expectation with respect to v−i.
Therefore, the interim payoff for buyer i ∈ N with value vi ∈ [0, 1] when he reports vˆi is
given by
Ui(vˆi| vi) = Qi(vˆi)vi − Ti(vˆi).
The mechanism (q, t) is (Bayesian) incentive-compatible if
Ui(vi| vi) ≥ Ui(vˆi| vi) for each i ∈ N and each vi, vˆi ∈ [0, 1]. (IC)
The mechanism (q, t) is (interim) individually rational if
Ui(vi| vi) ≥ 0 for each i ∈ N and each vi ∈ [0, 1]. (IR)
We also assume the following constraint. The mechanism (q, t) satisfies nonnegative
payments if
ti(v) ≥ 0 for each i ∈ N and each v ∈ [0, 1]n. (NP)
We believe that this is a reasonable restriction on feasible mechanisms given that pay-
13If
∑
i∈N qi(v) < 1, the seller keeps the object with positive probability 1−
∑
i∈N qi(v).
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ment from the seller to the buyer is unrealistic in many auctions in practice. In the standard
problem in the literature in which the designer assigns a positive weight for revenue, nonneg-
ative payments are necessarily satisfied in the solution. However, in our problem, in which
revenue has a negative weight, nonnegative payments play an important role. We further
discuss this point in Remark 2 after we introduce our main optimization problem.
The goal of the auction designer is to design a “pro-buyer” auction mechanism in a certain
sense. Although there are several essentially equivalent formulations, we first introduce
the surplus maximization problem under an upper-bound constraint for revenue, that is, a
revenue cap. More specifically, let R ∈ R+ denote an exogenously given upper bound for
expected revenue.14 Our problem is then expressed as follows:
max
(q,t)
Ev
[∑
i∈N
qi(v)vi
]
(P0(R))
subject to Ev
[∑
i∈N
ti(v)
] ≤ R, (RC)
(IC), (IR), and (NP).
Of course, the problem is trivial if R ≥ Re, where Re is the expected revenue in the
second-price auction without a revenue cap, because it achieves the highest surplus. The
case with R = 0 is also trivial because the only possibility is to allocate the object to one
buyer, possibly randomly but independent of the reported type profile. Therefore, in the
following we assume that R ∈ (0, Re).
When R ∈ (0, Re), the revenue-cap constraint (RC) is binding. To see this, consider any
mechanism (q, t) such that (RC) is slack. Let (qe, te) be the efficient second-price auction.
Since R ∈ (0, Re), the revenue equivalence implies that q cannot be the efficient assignment
14Note that we consider the upper bound on the expected revenue, not on the realized revenue. The problem
would be significantly different if the cap is imposed on the realized revenue. Since the realized revenue is
the same as the ex post payment of the winning buyer, the cap on the realized revenue is equivalent to
the liquidity constraint of the buyers. The literature studies the problem with liquidity-constrained buyers
intensively, and concludes that (variants of) the all-pay auctions are optimal. See Che and Gale (1996),
Laffont and Robert (1996), and Maskin (2000) among others for the discussions.
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function, that is, the expected social surplus given by (q, t) is smaller than that by (qe, te),
and thus smaller than that by
(
(1−ε)q+εqe, (1−ε)t+εte) for any ε ∈ (0, 1). For sufficiently
small ε > 0,
(
(1 − ε)q + εqe, (1 − ε)t + εte), achieving a higher surplus than (q, t), satisfies
(RC) along with other constraints. Thus, (q, t) does not solve the problem P0(R) if (RC) is
slack.
Remark 1. When R ≥ Re, the problem P0(R) is trivial as we saw above. It is possible to
consider the problem under the binding constraint of the expected revenue exactly equal to
R. If R coincides with the expected revenue Ro given by the revenue-maximizing auction, it
is simply the revenue-maximizing problem. If R ∈ (Re, Ro), we have an intermediate problem
between social surplus maximization and revenue maximization. It is readily shown that the
optimal mechanism in this problem with R is the second-price auction with an appropriate
reserve price r when the monotone virtual value condition holds true. As R decreases, r also
decreases continuously, and when R = Re, r = 0.
To decrease R beyond Re, we cannot lower r. In the subsequent section, we will show
that such small R < Re is optimally achieved by bunching. As R decreases to zero, the
region of the bunching expands. In the limit case of R = 0, the whole region is bunched,
i.e. the allocation is completely random. Thus, the mechanism continuously changes in the
revenue cap R.
Remark 2. Without (NP), our problem is trivial. For example, consider the procedure
whereby the seller first needs to pay an entrance fee Re, which is distributed among the
buyers, and then the seller runs a second-price auction. Then the expected revenue is always
zero (and hence the revenue-cap constraint is always satisfied) and S is maximized. A
problem with this procedure is that the seller incurs a loss if the buyers’ realized values are
low. Therefore, the seller’s participation (although not explicitly modeled in this paper) may
become problematic if his budget is constrained. Another potential problem is participation
by “nonserious buyers”.15 Suppose that there are many “nonserious buyers” whose values are
15McAfee and McMillan (1992) discuss the effects of nonserious buyers in auctions with cartels.
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zero and who need to pay a fixed (socially wasteful) cost to participate in the auction (e.g.,
opportunity costs for more valuable economic activities). In an anonymous environment in
which serious buyers cannot be distinguished from nonserious ones, nonserious buyers enter
the auction to earn a part of the seller’s entrance fee. The social cost of their entrance can
almost countervail the surplus obtained in the second-price auction.16
Another possibility may be to appoint one of the buyers randomly before their type
reports (say buyer 1), run the second-price auction among all buyers except for buyer 1, and
then give all the realized revenue to buyer 1. In this procedure, the seller’s ex post revenue
is zero, while the surplus is not maximized (because buyer 1 does not bid). Therefore, when
n is small, this is not a good alternative. Conversely, when n is very large, the effect of
excluding one buyer hardly affects the realized surplus; in fact, the expected surplus in this
case converges to that in the (all-buyer) second-price auction as n goes to infinity. Instead,
the problem is again due to the possibility of nonserious buyers. As in the first alternative,
many nonserious buyers may enter the game in an anonymous environment in which they
may possibly be selected as the revenue absorber. Their socially wasteful entrance may again
countervail the surplus obtained in the second-price auction.
Throughout the paper, we do not explicitly model the participation decisions of nonseri-
ous buyers. Instead, we simply impose the constraint (NP) to rule out such a possibility.
3 Constrained efficiency
In this section, we characterize the constrained-efficient auction mechanism and discuss its
important properties. Before stating our main results in Section 3.1, we give a brief review of
our results. By the standard argument on the envelope theorem, the original problem P0(R)
is reduced to the problem with the interim monotonicity constraint and the revenue-cap con-
straint. This problem is essentially equivalent to the maximization problem of a Lagrangian
16Formally, avoiding participation of nonserious buyers may be represented by Ti(0) ≥ 0, i ∈ N , which is
logically weaker than (ex post) nonnegative payments. However, in fact, we obtain the same results even if
we replace the nonnegative-payment constraint by this weaker condition.
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function subject to the interim monotonicity constraint, where the Lagrangian multiplier is
appropriately derived from the revenue cap R. This Lagrangian multiplier can be interpreted
as a “shadow price” in our auction design problem. We then formally solve the maximization
problem of the Lagrangian function. In Section 3.1, we characterize the main properties of
the solutions, and in Section 3.2, we provide the solution for specific classes of distributions.
In the Appendix, we provide a complete characterization of the solutions.
The following revenue-equivalence result is standard in the literature, and hence we omit
the proof.
Lemma 1. (q, t) satisfies (IC), (IR), and (NP), if and only if, for each i, (i) Qi(vi) is
nondecreasing in vi (“interim monotonicity”), and (ii) for each vi,
Ti(vi) = Qi(vi)vi −
∫ vi
0
Qi(v˜i)dv˜i,
where (ii) implies
Ev
[∑
i∈N
ti(v)
]
= Ev
[∑
i∈N
qi(v)ψ(vi)
]
.
Therefore, we can rewrite our original problem P0(R) as follows, which we call problem
P1(R).
max
q
Ev
[∑
i∈N
qi(v)vi
]
(P1(R))
subject to Ev
[∑
i∈N
qi(v)ψ(vi)
] ≤ R, (RC′)
Qi(vi) is nondecreasing for all i ∈ N . (M)
Let Q∗1(R) be the set of solutions to problem P1(R).17,18 We investigate this set Q∗1(R) of
17If q ∈ Q∗1(R), then obviously any qˆ that is interim monotonic and satisfies q = qˆ almost everywhere is
also in Q∗1(R). Throughout the paper, we treat such q and qˆ as equivalent and do not distinguish between
them.
18We observe that small misspecifications in the valuation distributions do not change the constrained-
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solutions using a two-step procedure. First, we reduce problem P1(R) to the maximization
of a Lagrangian function shown to have a (weakly) larger set of solutions that may or may
not satisfy the revenue-cap constraint. Second, among solutions in the reduced problem,
we choose those that satisfy the revenue-cap constraint. Because the Lagrangian is the
weighted sum of the expected surplus and the expected revenue, the maximization problem
for a weighted sum of the buyers’ and seller’s payoffs is solved as a byproduct of solving
the problem with a revenue cap. We note that, as emphasized in the Introduction, this
Lagrangian maximization problem has economically significant implications.
Because the set of all assignment functions q that satisfy the constraints is (weak-*)
compact and convex, for each R ∈ (0, Re), there exists a Lagrangian multiplier λ such that
(q∗, λ) is a saddle point of the Lagrangian
L = Ev
[∑
i∈N
qi(v)vi
]
+ λ
(
R− Ev
[∑
i∈N
qi(v)ψ(vi)
])
.
Since the revenue-cap constraint is binding when R ∈ (0, Re), we have λ > 0. More formally,
we have a reduced formulation of our problem as follows.
Proposition 1. Let R ∈ (0, Re). There exists λ > 0 such that for any solution q∗ ∈ Q∗1(R),
q∗ is also a solution to the following problem.
max
q
Ev
[∑
i∈N
qi(v)(vi − λψ(vi))
]
(P2(λ))
subject to (M).
Moreover, such λ > 0 is unique for each R ∈ (0, Re) and is nonincreasing in R.
The saddle point argument is standard, and hence we omit the proof.19 Thus, the only
efficient auctions significantly. In fact, by the maximum theorem, the correspondence which gives the set of
all constrained-efficient auctions from each distribution is upper hemi-continuous.
19See Luenberger (1969, Chapter 8) for technical details of the Lagrangian method in an infinite-
dimensional space.
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subtlety here is the uniqueness of the Lagrangian multiplier λ. We provide a formal proof
in Appendix A.1.
The objective of problem P2(λ) can be interpreted as a weighted sum of the buyers’
expected payoffs and the seller’s expected revenue, where the weight for the seller is smaller
than that for the buyers. In fact,
Ev
[∑
i∈N
qi(v)(vi − λψ(vi))
]
= Ev
[∑
i∈N
qi(v)(vi − ψ(vi))
]
+ (1− λ)Ev
[∑
i∈N
qi(v)ψ(vi)
]
= Ev
[
(Buyers’ total payoffs) + (1− λ)(Seller’s revenue)],
where the seller’s weight is 1 − λ < 1. Since λ is nonincreasing in R, we can say that the
problem becomes more “pro-buyer” as R decreases.20
Remark 3. By changing the Lagrange multiplier λ from −∞ to 1, we can show that the
problem P2(λ) includes both the pro-seller one and the pro-buyer one.
In the problem P2(λ), if the multiplier λ is nonpositive, the weight 1− λ for the seller’s
revenue is (weakly) larger than one, the weight for the buyers’ total payoffs. Since the weight
1 − λ is decreasing in λ, the observation in Remark 1 is reached again, i.e., the solution of
P0(R) is the “pro-seller” auction with the appropriate reserve when R ∈ [Re, Ro), and this
reserve decreases to zero as the cap R decreases to Re.
This paper, on the contrary, studies the opposite case of λ ∈ (0, 1]. When λ ∈ (0, 1],
the weight for the buyers’ is larger than that for the seller, and the weight increases as λ
increases to 1. Therefore, the objective of P2(λ) is the “pro-buyer,” which we believe is as
important as the “pro-seller” case.
Remark 4. Let us consider an application of problem P2(λ). Suppose that buyers have
outside options before participating in the auction, and choose not to participate if the
20Precisely, the problem becomes more “pro-buyer” as R decreases only when λ ≤ 1. When λ = 1, the
problem is the buyer-payoff maximization, and if λ > 1, the problem becomes less and less favorable for the
buyers as λ rises. In Proposition 6 in Section 3.1, however, we will see that λ < 1 under the assumption of
nondecreasing hazard rate, which is satisfied by most well-known distributions.
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payoff from the outside option exceeds the ex ante expected payoff in the auction. This
situation arises for example when other sellers who sell competing goods exist, and buyers
choose the seller that gives the largest expected payoff.
For simplicity, we assume symmetry between buyers, and denote by u ≥ 0 the outside-
option payoff for each buyer. To attract buyers, the seller has to guarantee to each buyer
an ex-ante expected payoff greater than or equal to u. If the seller wants to maximize the
expected revenue conditional on the given set of participating buyers, his optimal symmetric
auction mechanism is given by
max
(q,t)
Ev
[∑
i∈N
ti(v)
]
subject to (IC), (IR), (NP), and (buyer’s expected payoff) ≥ u.
We also assume that u is sufficiently high so that this constraint arising from the outside
option is binding. Since symmetry between agents implies that
(each buyer’s ex-ante expected payoff) =
1
n
(
(expected surplus)− (expected revenue)
)
=
1
n
(
Ev
[∑
i∈N
qi(v)vi
]− Ev[∑
i∈N
ti(v)
])
,
the above problem is equivalent to
max
(q,t)
Ev
[∑
i∈N
ti(v)
]
(1)
subject to (IC), (IR), (NP), and Ev
[∑
i∈N
qi(v)vi
]− Ev[∑
i∈N
ti(v)
]
= nu.
The argument similar to Lemma 1 and Proposition 1 shows that problem (1) is reduced to
the following problem:
max
q
Ev
[∑
i∈N
qi(v)(vi − (µ− 1)ψ(vi))
]
(2)
14
subject to (M),
where the Lagrangian multiplier µ is nondecreasing in u. Since two problems (P2(λ)) and (2)
have the same form, the auction design under the revenue-cap constraint solves the problem
considered here.
We finally note that if µ < 1, the weight for the seller is larger than that for the buyers
in the objective function. However, we can show that such cases never happen under the
standard assumption that the hazard rate is nondecreasing. In Section 4.2, we will discuss
more details about this issue.
Let Q∗2(λ) be the set of all solutions to problem P2(λ). We denote such a unique λ by
λ(R) when we want to be clear that λ is the Lagrangian multiplier corresponding to R.
Then Proposition 1 implies that Q∗1(R) ⊆ Q∗2(λ(R)). Thus, for each R ∈ (0, Re), we can
obtain the set of solutions Q∗1(R) by solving problem P2(λ) for each λ > 0, restricting the
set of solutions in Q∗2(λ) to those yielding expected revenue equal to R. Mathematically,
problem P2(λ) is viewed as a “subproblem” of P1(R) in this sense. Thus, in what follows
we first solve problem P2(λ).
In Section 3.3, we provide a sufficient condition for the shape of ψ with which Q∗1(R) =
Q∗2(λ(R)). However, in general, it is possible that different q, qˆ ∈ Q∗2(λ) yield different ex-
pected surplus and revenue pairs (even though, of course, the expected surplus minus λ
times the expected revenue must be the same). Therefore, in solving P2(λ) we are particu-
larly interested in the extremal solutions (i.e., those that achieve the highest/lowest pairs of
expected surplus and revenue).
Remark 5. Before the formal analysis, we provide some intuition regarding how to deter-
mine the winner of the auction in problem P2(λ). Consider the second-price auction with
no reserve price as a benchmark. Since it violates the revenue-cap constraint, we need to
reduce the expected revenue or, equivalently, the expected virtual value, without reducing
the expected surplus by much. Assume that the winner of the second-price auction is buyer
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i at value profile v = (v1, . . . , vn). If the winner is replaced by another j (̸= i), the sur-
plus decreases by vi − vj and the virtual surplus decreases by ψ(vi) − ψ(vj). Therefore, we
should change the winner to buyer j with j ∈ argmaxk ̸=i ψ(vi)−ψ(vk)vi−vk . In words, the differ-
ence rate of the virtual value ψ, not the difference itself, determines the construction of our
revenue-capped efficient auction.
In fact, the form of the objective in problem P2(λ) implies that buyer j wins the object
at v if vj − λψ(vj) > vk − λψ(vk) for all k ̸= j or, equivalently,
λ
ψ(vj)− ψ(vk)
vj − vk > 1,
where λ may be interpreted as the shadow price for the revenue-cap constraint.
Although our basic idea is to modify the mechanism according to the argument in Re-
mark 5, such modification may well lead to a violation of the monotonicity constraint. Thus,
to fully characterize the solution to our problem, we use a “bunching” technique developed
by Myerson (1981, Section 6) and Baron and Myerson (1982).21
Let ϕ(x) = x − λψ(x) for each x ∈ [0, 1]. We introduce a function ϕ¯ : [0, 1] → R as
follows. Because the cumulative distribution function F has a positive density function, F
is continuous and strictly increasing, and thus has a continuous inverse function F−1. For
each p ∈ [0, 1], let h(p) = ϕ(F−1(p)) and
H(p) =
∫ p
0
h(p′)dp′.
Note thatH is continuously differentiable because h(p) = F−1(p)−λψ(F−1(p)) is continuous.
Let G be the “convex hull” of H, defined by
G(p) = min{αH(p′) + (1− α)H(p′′) | (p′, p′′, α) ∈ [0, 1]3 s.t. αp′ + (1− α)p′′ = p}.
21Toikka (2011) generalizes this technique. See Guensnerie and Laffont (1984) for a general methodology
applying optimal control theory.
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This function G is convex and continuously differentiable. Let g denote its derivative, and
we define ϕ¯(x) = g(F (x)). Since g is continuous, ϕ¯ is also continuous. Intuitively, ϕ¯ modifies
ϕ by “flattening” the non-monotonic part of ϕ so that ϕ¯ is monotonic. This modified version
of the virtual value function, ϕ¯, plays a central role in our characterization. We first show
that ϕ¯(x) is always positive when x > 0.
Lemma 2. For all x > 0 and all λ > 0, ϕ¯(x) > 0.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
This property is used repeatedly in our subsequent analysis.
In Appendix A.3, we characterize the set of solutions to P2(λ). Here, we explain the
properties of the solutions, and provide a specific solution to P2(λ). Similar to the standard
situation in the literature, the optimal assignment function maximizes (the modified version
of) the virtual surplus, Ev[
∑
i qi(v)ϕ¯(vi)]. Because Lemma 2 guarantees ϕ¯(vi) > 0 (with
probability one), buyer i wins if ϕ¯(vi) is the highest among all the buyers. However, owing
to potential bunching, i does not necessarily win with probability one even if his value vi
is the highest among all the buyers, when there is another agent j who has vj < vi but
ϕ¯(vi) = ϕ¯(vj). In fact, values in each interval {x | ϕ¯(x) = ϕ¯(vi)} may be bunched together
with vi in the sense that the interim winning probability for buyer i is constant in each of
these intervals.
There can be multiple solutions to problem P2(λ). They differ in the tie-breaking rule,
that is, who wins if there are multiple buyers who have the highest value of ϕ¯. In the standard
situation in which bunching does not occur, such differences are not essential because the
probability of ties among virtual values is zero. However, in our environment, such events
occur with a strictly positive probability.
For each λ > 0, we introduce a symmetric assignment function q∗, which turns out to
be an “extreme” solution to problem P2(λ) in the sense that they lead to the minimum
expected revenue among all solutions. Let q∗ be an assignment function defined by, for each
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i ∈ N and v ∈ [0, 1]n,
q∗i (v) =

1/ |argmaxj∈N ϕ¯(vj)| if i ∈ argmaxj∈N ϕ¯(vj),
0 otherwise.
(3)
This assignment function q∗ assigns the object to one of the agents with the largest value of
ϕ¯(vi) with equal probability. Thus, bunching occurs on each interval on which ϕ¯ is constant.
That is, for each i ∈ N , Q∗i (vi) is constant when ϕ¯(vi) is constant.
In Appendix A.3, we show that q∗ is a solution to P2(λ) that achieves the lowest expected
revenue among all solutions, and provide another assignment function q∗∗ that achieves the
highest expected revenue among all solutions.22
3.1 General properties of the constrained-efficient mechanism
Although the exact form of the constrained-efficient mechanism varies with parameters such
as the distribution F , we can derive important properties in common. In the constrained-
efficient auction, the mechanism designer has to admit some efficiency loss to lower the
expected revenue from the efficient auction. There could be two possible sources of efficiency
loss: the reserve price and the bunching. In Proposition 2, we show that a reserve price can-
not be set in any constrained-efficient auction, and in Proposition 3, we show that bunching
always emerges. Furthermore, Proposition 4 claims that as the revenue-cap constraint be-
comes more stringent, the bunching region becomes larger in terms of the set inclusion. When
the constraint is severe enough, Proposition 5 states that any symmetric constrained-efficient
auction exhibits “distortion at the top,” that is, bunching occurs near the highest possible
value. This property contrasts the standard auction with a positive weight on the expected
revenue, in which “no distortion at the top” is known to hold. Finally, in Proposition 6, we
show that under the assumption of the nondecreasing hazard rate, the weight for the seller
22The minimum and maximum of the expected revenue coincide in some cases and differ in other cases.
We discuss the multiplicity of expected revenues in Section A.7.
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is positive.
Now, we state each proposition in order. The proofs are given in Appendix A.5. The
first property is that for almost all v ∈ [0, 1]n, the seller does not keep the object.
Proposition 2. For any R ∈ (0, Re) and any solution q ∈ Q∗1(R), we have
∑
i∈N qi(v) = 1
with probability one.
This proposition says that in any constrained-efficient auction, a reserve price cannot be
set. We note that this property is not as obvious as it seems. Since we do not assume that
the virtual value function is monotonic, it is possible that the introduction of a reserve price
lowers the expected revenue. Proposition 2 claims that bunching is a better tool to reduce
the expected revenue even in such cases.
The second property of our constrained-efficient mechanism is that when R ∈ (0, Re),
some bunching is necessary. With a revenue cap strictly less than Re, the expected rev-
enue (and the expected surplus) must be lowered from the (efficient) second-price auction.
However, as in the previous result, the object is sold with probability one. This is the main
intuitive reason why bunching is necessary to achieve revenue reduction.
Recall that Q∗i is the interim probability of q
∗
i defined in equality (3). According to
the following proposition, values corresponding to some intervals are pooled (or bunched)
together in the sense that Q∗i is constant in this interval.
Proposition 3. For each R ∈ (0, Re) and each i ∈ N , there exists an open interval (a, b) ⊂
[0, 1] on which the interim probability Q∗i (x) is constant, where q
∗ is given by equality (3)
with λ = λ(R).23
In addition to Proposition 3, we can show that as the revenue cap R becomes more
stringent so that λ(R) becomes (weakly) higher, the bunching regions become larger in the
set-inclusion order.
23Although this statement concerns only q∗, the conclusion is true for any solution to problem P2(λ). See
the discussion after the proof of Proposition 3 in Appendix A.5.
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Proposition 4. Suppose that for each R ∈ (0, Re) and each λ˜ > λ(R), q∗ is the solution
to problem P2(λ(R)) and q˜∗ is the solution to problem P2(λ˜) defined in equality (3). Let Q∗i
and Q˜∗i be the interim probability for buyer i in q
∗ and q˜∗, respectively. For each i ∈ N , if
Q∗i is constant on (a, b), then Q˜
∗
i is constant (at least) on the same interval (a, b).
The exact regions where bunching occurs depend on the parameters. However, when the
revenue-cap constraint is “severe enough” so that λ(R) > 1/2,24 bunching must occur (at
least) at the top, that is, the highest possible value of the object for a region close to 1. In
the standard case with a positive weight on revenue, we generally have the property of “no
distortion at the top”, which implies that the buyer with vi = 1 wins with probability one.
However, this property is lost in our context.
Proposition 5. For all λ > 1/2 and all q ∈ Q∗2(λ), q exhibits distortion at the top for at
least n − 1 buyers, that is, there exists j ∈ N such that limvi↗1Qi(vi) < 1 for all i ̸= j. In
particular, if q is symmetric, then limvi↗1Qi(vi) < 1 for each i ∈ N .
This result provides a logical connection between a revenue cap, which represents the
degree to which the designer is pro-buyer, and a bid cap, which is a specific constraint on
the auction rule.
So far, λ(R) is not necessarily less than 1 for R ∈ (0, Re). This means that in the cor-
responding maximization problem P2(λ(R)) of a weighted sum of the buyers’ and seller’s
payoffs, the weight for the seller may be negative. In such a case, we may consider it strange
to interpret this problem as a social planner’s weighted surplus maximization problem, be-
cause each person is usually assigned a nonnegative weight for such a problem. However,
this “strange” situation never occurs in the regular cases in which F has a strictly in-
creasing hazard rate. In fact, if λ ≥ 1 and the hazard rate is strictly increasing, then
ϕ(vi) = vi − λ ·
(
vi − 1−F (vi)f(vi)
)
= −(λ − 1)vi + λ1−F (vi)f(vi) is strictly decreasing in vi. There-
fore, given the interim monotonicity constraint for the assignment function, the solution
24As a caveat, we do not claim that R “severe enough” to induce λ(R) > 12 always exists; for example, see
the concave virtual-values case in Section 3.2.2.
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to problem P2(λ(R)) is constant, which obviously implies that the seller’s revenue is zero,
contradicting the assumption R > 0.
The following proposition shows that this argument holds true even when F has a non-
decreasing hazard rate.
Proposition 6. If F has a nondecreasing hazard rate, then λ(R) ∈ (0, 1) for each R ∈
(0, Re).
3.2 Convex/concave virtual values
The complete characterization of bunching regions is generally a daunting task, but can
be straightforward in certain cases. In this section, we consider distributions F such that
the virtual value function ψ(x) = x − 1−F (x)
f(x)
is either convex or concave. As discussed in
Remark 5, the inverse of the difference rate or gradient of ψ is interpreted as a shadow
price, which changes monotonically when ψ is either convex or concave. This monotonicity
simplifies our analysis. When ψ is convex, for each x, y with 0 < x < y < 1, the gradient
ψ(y)−ψ(x)
y−x is nondecreasing in x and y. This implies that the shadow price is low at value
profiles with large values. Thus, bunching happens at value profiles with large values in
the constrained-efficient auction. Conversely, when ψ is concave, bunching happens at value
profiles with small values in the constrained-efficient auction.
A variety of distributions satisfy such convexity or concavity. A class of special cases
includes distributions with a constant or linear hazard rate, such as exponential and uniform
distributions. Other examples follow.
Example 1. Let F (x) = xα, where α is a positive constant. Then the virtual value function
is convex if α ∈ (0, 1], and concave if α ≥ 1.25
Example 2. Let f(x) = α(x− 1/2)+1, where α ∈ (−2, 2). Then the virtual value function
is convex if α ∈ (−2, 0], and concave if α ∈ [0, 2).
25This example violates our regularity assumption that F has a positive and continuously differentiable
density function on [0, 1]. However, we can show that our results so far hold true for these cases.
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3.2.1 Convex virtual values
We consider the case in which ψ is convex or, equivalently, ϕ is concave. In this case,
bunching occurs only at the top.
Proposition 7. Suppose that ψ(x) is convex. For each R ∈ (0, Re), we have λ(R) ≥ 1/2,
and there exists a solution q∗ to problem P1(R) and w¯ ∈ (0, 1) such that for each i ∈ N and
each v ∈ [0, 1]n,
q∗i (v) =

1/ |argmax{vj | j ∈ N, vj ≥ w¯}| if vi ≥ w¯,
1/ |argmax{vj | j ∈ N}| if vi = maxj∈N vj < w¯,
0 otherwise.
Proof. See Appendix A.6.
The assignment function q∗ in Proposition 7 is shown in Figure 1 for n = 2. This q∗ can
be implemented in dominant strategies by the indirect second-price auction with bid cap w¯,
where the object is allocated at random if all bids are w¯ and the highest bid wins otherwise.
Every buyer bids the true value if and only if the value is below w¯, and bid w¯ otherwise. By
Lemma 1, a corresponding transfer function is the one in the second-price auction with bid
cap w¯.
Example 3. Let n = 2 and F (x) =
√
x in [0, 1]. As noted in Example 1, this distribution
is associated with a strictly convex virtual value function. Straightforward computation
shows that for each w¯ ∈ [0, 1], the auction in Proposition 7 yields expected revenue given by
w¯ − 4
3
w¯
3
2 + 1
2
w¯2. This relationship between revenue cap R and w¯ is described in Figure 2.
In the efficient auction with w¯ = 1, the seller earns an expected revenue of 1/6. If R lies
between 0 and 1/6, the mechanism in Proposition 8 is a constrained-efficient auction with
bid cap w¯ corresponding to R.
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Figure 1: A constrained-efficient assignment function q∗(v1, v2) when the virtual value func-
tion is convex.
0
R
w¯
1
6
1
Figure 2: The threshold w¯ when n = 2 and F (x) =
√
x.
3.2.2 Concave virtual values
We consider the case in which ψ is concave or, equivalently, ϕ is convex. In this case,
bunching occurs only at the bottom.
Proposition 8. Suppose that ψ(x) is concave. For each R ∈ (0, Re), λ(R) ≤ 1/2 and there
exist a solution q∗ to problem P1(R) and w ∈ (0, 1) such that for each i ∈ N and each
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v ∈ [0, 1]n,
q∗i (v) =

1/ |argmaxj∈N vj| if vi = maxj∈N vj > w,
1/n if maxj∈N vj ≤ w,
0 otherwise.
Proof. See Appendix A.6.
The assignment function q∗ in Proposition 8 is shown in Figure 3 for n = 2. This q∗ can
be achieved using a modified form of the second-price auction with minimum bid w, where
each buyer i bids the true value if vi ≥ w, and w otherwise. By Lemma 1, a corresponding
transfer function is such that if the bid by i is the highest, then: (a) if this bid is w, the
winner’s payment is zero; (b) if this bid exceeds w and the second highest bid is w, then the
payment is n−1
n
w; and (c) if both this bid and the second highest bid exceed w, the payment
equals the second highest bid.
This outcome can be achieved by the following two-stage mechanism. In the first stage,
every buyer simultaneously decides whether to participate in the auction. If no buyer partic-
ipates, the object is given for free to the buyer selected randomly with equal probability. If
some buyers participate, the mechanism proceeds to the second stage, in which the second-
price auction with reserve price n−1
n
w is held. It is readily seen that there exists an ex post
Nash equilibrium in which the buyers participate if and only if the value is no less than w,
and bid truthfully in the second stage irrespective of the participants.
Example 4. Let n = 2 and F (x) = x2 in [0, 1]. As noted in Example 1, this distribution is
associated with a concave virtual value function. Straightforward computation shows that for
each w ∈ [0, 1], the auction in Proposition 7 yields expected revenue given by 8
15
− 1
3
w3− 1
5
w5.
This relationship between revenue cap R and w is illustrated in Figure 4. In the efficient
auction with w = 0, the seller earns an expected revenue of 8/15. If R lies between 0 and
8/15, the mechanism in Proposition 8 is a constrained-efficient auction with w corresponding
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Figure 3: A constrained-efficient assignment function q∗(v1, v2) when the virtual value func-
tion is concave.
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Figure 4: The threshold w when n = 2 and F (x) = x2.
to R.
3.2.3 Linear virtual values
If the virtual value ψ(x) is an affine function,26 ψ(x) is both convex and concave, and thus
both assignment functions defined in Propositions 7 and 8 are constrained-efficient. This
observation suggests that multiple constrained-efficient auctions exist in this case. We pick
the uniform distribution as a representative case and analyze this in more detail because the
solutions can be computed directly.
Consider the uniform distribution on [0, 1] under which the virtual value function is
26This holds if F (x) = 1− (1− x)γ for some γ > 0.
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ψ(x) = 2x− 1. Let λ = 1/2. Then problem P2(1/2) is rewritten as
max
q
Ev
[1
2
∑
i∈N
qi(v)
]
subject to (M).
Thus, any interim monotonic assignment function q is a solution to problem P2(1/2) if q
satisfies Ev
[∑
i∈N qi(v)
]
= 1. For each R ∈ (0, Re), any solution to problem P1(R) must
satisfy Ev
[∑
i∈N qi(v)
]
= 1 by Proposition 2. Hence, λ(R) = 1/2 for all R ∈ (0, Re).
Problem P1(R) is rewritten as
max
q
Ev
[∑
i∈N
qi(v)vi
]
subject to Ev
[∑
i∈N
qi(v)vi
] ≤ 1
2
(R + 1), and (M),
where Ev
[∑
i∈N qi(v)
]
= 1. Therefore, an interim monotonic assignment function q is a solu-
tion to problem P1(R) if and only if q satisfies Ev
[∑
i∈N qi(v)
]
= 1 and Ev
[∑
i∈N qi(v)vi
]
=
1
2
(R + 1). This implies that solutions in Q∗2(1/2) yield multiple levels of the expected rev-
enue and the expected surplus. Intuitively, we can obtain the constrained-efficient auction
by bunching on any interval(s) if the resulting expected revenue equals R. A simple instance
of the constrained-efficient auction is a second-price auction with a bid cap as in Proposition
7.
4 Applications
4.1 Multi-unit auction
In this section, we consider auctions in which the seller possesses multiple units of a good
with some positive probability. Because of multiple possibilities with respect to the number
26
of units the seller has, the mechanism designer needs to construct both single-unit and multi-
unit auctions. If he has multiple units and the number of units is his private information, the
seller may have an incentive to throw away a part of units if the expected revenue would be
higher with a smaller number of units. This disposal of objects causes misallocation of the
objects, leading to the efficiency loss. Our analysis in Section 3 helps to tackle this problem.
For simplicity, assume that the seller possesses at most two units of homogeneous objects.
The number of units owned by the seller is his private information. He has one unit with
probability pi ∈ (0, 1), and two units with probability 1−pi. If he has two units, he can falsely
report that he has only one unit, and dispose of the remaining unit secretly. Conversely, it
is impossible to misreport that he has two units when he has only one unit. There are two
buyers, each of whom has a single-unit demand.27
The auction designer designs a direct mechanism
(
(qk, tk)
)2
k=1
in which the seller and
the buyers simultaneously report their private information; the seller reports the number of
units k he possesses, and each buyer i = 1, 2 reports his value vi. For each k = 1, 2, (q
k, tk)
is the auction mechanism when the seller provides k units. Feasibility requires qki ∈ [0, 1]
and
∑
i q
k
i (v) ≤ k for all i, k, v.
Let Rk be the expected revenue from auction (qk, tk) for each k. To rule out an incentive
to misreport the number of units when the seller has two units, we need R1 ≤ R2. Therefore,
we consider the maximization problem
max
((q1,t1),(q2,t2))
piS1 + (1− pi)S2 (4)
subject to (IC), (IR), (NP) for each k = 1, 2, and
R1 ≤ R2, (DP)
where Sk is the expected social surplus in auction (qk, tk) for each k = 1, 2. We refer to
27We consider this two-buyer, two-unit setting for simplicity, but we obtain a similar conclusion in more
general settings.
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constraint (DP) as destruction-proofness.28
In the efficient mechanism, if the seller has two units, then both buyers obtain the objects
without payments, regardless of their values. This implies that R2 = 0. Conversely, if the
seller has only one unit, then the second-price auction yields a positive expected revenue
R1 > 0. Therefore, efficiency is incompatible with the constraint (DP), and in the second-
best problem (4), (DP) must be binding. More specifically, let
(
(q¯1, t¯1), (q¯2, t¯2)
)
be a solution
to problem (4). Then there exists a constant R¯ > 0 such that for each k = 1, 2, (q¯k, t¯k) solves
max
(qk,tk)
Sk (4.k)
subject to (IC), (IR), (NP), and Rk = R¯.
Since (DP) is binding, R¯ is less than or equal to the expected revenue from the efficient
second-price auction with a single unit. Thus, problem (4.k) with k = 1 is the same as
P0(R¯) in Section 2. For k = 2, problem (4.k) can be analyzed in a standard manner, and
the solution is a uniform-price auction with some reserve price. The level of R¯ is determined
to maximize the expected social surplus piS1 + (1− pi)S2.
Example 5. Consider the above setting. Suppose that the valuation is uniformly distributed
over [0, 1]. In problem (4.2), we can restrict attention to the uniform-price auction with
reserve price r ∈ [0, 1] (i.e., the posted-price r in this case), which yields the expected
revenue R2 = 2r(1 − r) and the expected surplus S2 = 1 − r2. In problem (4.1), the
argument in Section 3.2.1 shows that we can focus on the second-price auction with a bid-
cap w ∈ [0, 1], which yields the expected revenue R1 = 1
3
(w3 − 3w2 + 3w) and the expected
surplus S1 = 1
6
(w3−3w2+3w+3). Solving problem (4) for each pi ∈ (0, 1), the constrained-
efficient auctions are given by r and w given in Figure 5, where p¯i = 3−
√
3
3
. When pi ∈ (p¯i, 1),
the constraint w ≤ 1 is binding and we have a corner solution: r = 3−
√
3
6
and w = 1, thus
the single-unit auction is efficient in this case. When pi ∈ (0, p¯i], r = pi/2 and w is a solution
28Muto and Shirata (2017) provide a restricted domain of valuation profiles in which efficient auctions
satisfying destruction-proofness exist among general combinatorial auctions.
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Figure 5: The reserve price r in the two-unit auction (left), and the bid cap w in the single-
unit auction (right).
of equation R1 = R2.
4.2 Buyers’ outside options at the ex ante stage
In some cases, buyers may have outside options before participating in the auction, and
choose not to participate if the payoff from the outside option exceeds the ex ante expected
payoff in the auction. For example, other sellers who sell competing goods may exist, and
buyers choose the seller that gives the largest ex-ante expected payoff.
In this subsection, we assume that the hazard rate f(x)
1−F (x) is nondecreasing. We focus
on a fixed seller and suppose that n buyers participate in this seller’s auction. We assume
symmetry between buyers, and denote by u ≥ 0 the outside-option payoff for each buyer.
When u is sufficiently high so that this constraint arising from the outside option is binding,
we showed in Remark 4 in Section 3 that the expected revenue maximization problem subject
to the participation constraint of the buyers is equivalent to problem (1).
We now revisit the original problem P0(R).
max
(q,t)
Ev
[∑
i∈N
qi(v)vi
]
subject to (IC), (IR), (NP), and Ev
[∑
i∈N
ti(v)
] ≤ R.
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Let S be the maximum social surplus in the above problem. Since we assumed monotonicity
for the hazard rate, Proposition 6 implies that λ(R) < 1 for all R ∈ (0, Re). Since the differ-
ential coefficient for the Lagrangian at the optimal point is zero, the expected social surplus
S in the constrained-efficient auction decreases at a speed slower than R does. Therefore,
if S (and S ′) is the expected social surplus in the constrained-efficient auction with R (and
R′), then R > R′ if and only if S − R < S ′ − R′. Thus, the revenue-cap constraint can be
replaced by Ev
[∑
i∈N qi(v)vi
] − Ev[∑i∈N ti(v)] ≥ S − R. Since we assumed that R < Re,
the revenue-cap constraint is binding. Therefore, our original problem P0(R) is equivalent
to
max
(q,t)
Ev
[∑
i∈N
qi(v)vi
]
subject to (IC), (IR), (NP), and Ev
[∑
i∈N
qi(v)vi
]− Ev[∑
i∈N
ti(v)
]
= S −R.
This problem has the same form as (1) up to a constant. Hence, the problems with the
outside option and our original problem have a common set of solutions when the hazard
rate is nondecreasing. In conclusion, our analysis can be useful even in certain situations in
which the seller’s objective is revenue maximization.
We conclude this subsection with contrasting our result to the existing literature on
competing auctions. In our model, each buyer is assumed to choose a seller at the ex ante
stage (i.e., before knowing his value). This ex-ante participation assumption is reasonable,
for example, when a constructor has to investigate the worksite and estimate the cost only
after the participation decision is made (Peters and Severinov, 1997).
Among many papers, Peters and Severinov (1997, Section 3) consider the ex-ante partic-
ipation.29 In Peters and Severinov (1997), the set of mechanisms available for the sellers is
restricted to the second-price auctions with a reserve price. This restriction poses no prob-
lem because they are interested in the competitive market in which the number of potential
29See also Albrecht et al. (2012).
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buyers is very large relative to the number of sellers. If the competition between buyers is
incomplete, our result might suggest that auctions with bunching should also be considered.
A Appendix
A.1 Proof of uniqueness of λ in problem P1(R)
Pick λ1 and λ2 satisfying λ1 < λ2. We fix a solution qk to problem P2(λk) for each k = 1, 2.
Let Sk and Rk be the expected social surplus and expected revenue, respectively, under qk for
each k = 1, 2. We assume that Rk ∈ (0, Re) for each k = 1, 2 and prove that R1 > R2. This
shows that λ1 ̸= λ2 implies R1 ̸= R2, and the uniqueness of λ follows for each R ∈ (0, Re).
We assume that R1 ≤ R2, and derive a contradiction. Since the objective function of
P2(λk) equals Sk−λkRk for each k, the value of the objective at (q2, λ1) is S2−λ1R2. Since
q1 is a solution to problem P2(λ1), we have S1 − λ1R1 ≥ S2 − λ1R2. Since q2 is a solution
to problem P2(λ2), we have S2 − λ2R2 ≥ S1 − λ2R1. Applying these two inequalities,
we have λ1(R2 − R1) ≥ S2 − S1 ≥ λ2(R2 − R1). Since we assumed that R1 ≤ R2, then
(R1, S1) = (R2, S2). By this equality, problems P2(λ1) and P2(λ2) share the same set of
solutions. Specifically, let q∗ be the solution to problem P2(λ2) defined in equality (3) when
λ = λ2.30 This must be a solution to problem P2(λ1). Since R2 < Re, there exists an open
interval in which ϕ¯(x) is constant. (Otherwise, ϕ¯ is strictly increasing, and q∗ assigns the
object efficiently. This contradicts the assumption R < Re.)
Let (a, b) (where 0 ≤ a < b ≤ 1) be the interval such that ϕ¯(x) < ϕ¯(a) for all x ∈ [0, a)
and ϕ¯(x) > ϕ¯(b) for all x ∈ (b, 1]. Since ϕ¯ is continuous, ϕ¯(a) = ϕ¯(b). Since ϕ¯(x) = ϕ(x)
whenever ϕ¯(x) is strictly increasing in a small neighborhood of x, we have ϕ¯(a) = ϕ(a) and
ϕ¯(b) = ϕ(b). Thus, ϕ(a) = ϕ(b), that is, a−λ2ψ(a) = b−λ2ψ(b). Because b > a, then ψ(b)−
ψ(a) = (b− a)/λ2 > 0. Let ϕλ1(x) := x− λ1ψ(x) for each x ∈ [0, 1]. Then we have ϕλ1(a) <
30Proposition 10 in Appendix A.3 proves that q∗ is a solution to problem P2(λ2). We note that Proposi-
tion 10 does not rely on uniqueness of λ.
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ϕλ1(b) because ϕλ1(b) − ϕλ1(a) = (b − a) − λ1(ψ(b) − ψ(a)) > (b − a) − λ2(ψ(b) − ψ(a)) =
ϕ(b) − ϕ(a) = 0. Since ϕλ1 is continuous, there exist a′ and b′ such that a < a′ < b′ < b,
maxx∈[a,a′] |ϕλ1(x)−ϕλ1(a)| ≤ (ϕλ1(b)−ϕλ1(a))/6, and maxx∈[b′,b] |ϕλ1(x)−ϕλ1(b)| ≤ (ϕλ1(b)−
ϕλ1(a))/6. Let V˜ = {v ∈ [0, 1]n | ∃j ∈ N such that vj ∈ [b′, b] and vk ∈ [a, a′] for ∀k ̸= j},
and let q˜ be the following assignment function: for each i ∈ N and each v ∈ [0, 1],
q˜i(v) =

1 if v ∈ V˜ and vi ∈ [b′, b],
0 if v ∈ V˜ and vi ∈ [a, a′],
q∗(v) if v ̸∈ V˜ .
This assignment function satisfies monotonicity.
Let a¯ ∈ argmaxx∈[a,a′] ϕλ1(x), b¯ ∈ argmaxx∈[b′,b] ϕλ1(x), and b ∈ argminx∈[b′,b] ϕλ1(x).
Since
Ev
[∑
i∈N
q∗i (v)ϕλ1(vi)
∣∣∣ v ∈ V˜ ] ≤ 1
n
ϕλ1(b¯) +
n− 1
n
ϕλ1(a¯) and
Ev
[∑
i∈N
q˜i(v)ϕλ1(vi)
∣∣∣ v ∈ V˜ ] ≥ ϕλ1(b),
we have
Ev
[∑
i∈N
q˜i(v)ϕλ1(vi)
∣∣∣ v ∈ V˜ ]− Ev[∑
i∈N
q∗i (v)ϕλ1(vi)
∣∣∣ v ∈ V˜ ]
≥ ϕλ1(b)− 1
n
ϕλ1(b¯)− n− 1
n
ϕλ1(a¯)
=
n− 1
n
(
ϕλ1(b)− ϕλ1(a)
)− (ϕλ1(b)− ϕλ1(b))− 1
n
(
ϕλ1(b¯)− ϕλ1(b)
)− n− 1
n
(
ϕλ1(a¯)− ϕλ1(a)
)
≥ n− 1
n
(
ϕλ1(b)− ϕλ1(a)
)− 1
6
(
ϕλ1(b)− ϕλ1(a)
)− 1
6n
(
ϕλ1(b)− ϕλ1(a)
)− n− 1
6n
(
ϕλ1(b)− ϕλ1(a)
)
=
(n− 1
n
− 1
3
)(
ϕλ1(b)− ϕλ1(a)
)
> 0.
Therefore, q˜ improves the value of the objective in problem P2(λ1). This contradicts the
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assumption that q∗ is a solution to problem P2(λ1).
A.2 Proof of Lemma 2
Note that, for all x ∈ [0, 1],
∫ x
0
ψ(y) dF (y) =
∫ x
0
(
yf(y)− (1− F (y)))dy
= −x(1− F (x)).
Set λ > 0 arbitrarily. For all x ∈ [0, 1],
H(F (x)) =
∫ x
0
(
y − λψ(y))dF (y)
=
∫ x
0
y dF (y) + λx(1− F (x)).
Thus, H(0) = 0 and H(p) > 0 for all p ∈ (0, 1], and by the property of a convex hull, we have
G(0) = 0 and G(p) > 0 for all p ∈ (0, 1]. This implies that g(0) ≥ 0, and by the convexity
of G, g(p) ≥ 0 for all p ∈ [0, 1]. If g(p) = 0 for some p ∈ (0, 1], then by the convexity of G,
g(p′) = 0 for all p′ ∈ [0, p], which implies that G(p) = 0. Because this is a contradiction, we
have g(p) > 0 for all p ∈ (0, 1]. Hence, ϕ¯(x) > 0 for all x > 0 and all λ > 0.
A.3 A characterization of the constrained-efficient auctions.
The following proposition characterizes the set of solutions to P2(λ).
Proposition 9. For each λ > 0, let Q∗∗2 (λ) be the set of interim monotonic assignment
functions q such that
(i) for each v ∈ [0, 1]n, ∑{i|ϕ¯(vi)=maxj∈N ϕ¯(vj)} qi(v) = 1, and
(ii) for each i ∈ N and each vi ∈ [0, 1], if G(F (vi)) < H(F (vi)), then Qi is differentiable
at vi and Q
′
i(vi) = 0.
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Then Q∗∗2 (λ) ⊂ Q∗2(λ), and for any solution q˜ ∈ Q∗2(λ) there exists q ∈ Q∗∗2 (λ) such that
q(v) = q˜(v) with probability one.
Proof. The proof is based on Myerson (1981, Section 6). The objective in problem P2(λ) is
rewritten as follows:
∑
i∈N
Ev
[
qi(v)
(
vi − λψ(vi)
)]
=
∑
i∈N
Evi
[
Qi(vi)ϕ(vi)
]
=
∑
i∈N
Evi
[
Qi(vi)
(
g(F (vi)) + h(F (vi))− g(F (vi))
)]
=
∑
i∈N
Evi
[
Qi(vi)ϕ¯(vi)
]
+
∑
i∈N
Evi
[
Qi(vi)
(
h(F (vi))− g(F (vi))
)]
=
∑
i∈N
Evi
[
Qi(vi)ϕ¯(vi)
]
+
∑
i∈N
[
Qi(vi)
(
H(F (vi))−G(F (vi))
)]1
0
−
∑
i∈N
∫ 1
0
(
H(F (vi))−G(F (vi))
)
dQi(vi).
Because G(0) = H(0) and G(1) = H(1) by the definition of G, then
∑
i∈N
[
Qi(vi)
(
H(F (vi))−
G(F (vi))
)]1
0
= 0. Therefore,
∑
i∈N
Evi
[
Qi(vi)ϕ(vi)
]
=
∑
i∈N
Evi
[
Qi(vi)ϕ¯(vi)
]
+
∑
i∈N
∫ 1
0
(
G(F (vi))−H(F (vi))
)
dQi(vi). (5)
We first show that Q∗∗2 (λ) ⊂ Q∗2(λ). It suffices to show that if q ∈ Q∗∗2 (λ), then q maxi-
mizes both terms on the right-hand side of (5) separately. First, q maximizes the first term∑
i∈N Evi
[
Qi(vi)ϕ¯(vi)
]
by Lemma 2 and (i) in the statement. Second, q maximizes the sec-
ond term on the right-hand side of (5) because of the following. Since H(p) ≥ G(p) for all
p ∈ [0, 1] by the definition of G, the second term is nonpositive. We show that if q satisfies
(ii) in the statement, then the second term is zero. Suppose that there exists x ∈ (0, 1) such
that G(F (x)) < H(F (x)). Because G and H are continuous, there exists vi, v
′
i ∈ (0, 1) such
that vi < x < v
′
i and G(F (y)) < H(F (y)) for all y ∈ (vi, v′i). By (ii), Qi(x) is constant in
(vi, v
′
i). This implies that
∑
i∈N
∫ v′i
vi
(
G(F (x)) − H(F (x))) dQi(x) = 0. Because x ∈ (0, 1)
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was arbitrary, the second term is zero. This shows that q is a solution to problem P2(λ). It
is easy to see that q∗ ∈ Q∗∗2 (λ), where q∗ is defined in equality (3), and thus Q∗∗2 (λ) ̸= ∅.
We now show that if q˜ is a solution to problem P2(λ), then there exists q ∈ Q∗∗2 (λ) such
that Prob{v | q˜(v) = q(v)} = 1. Note that the argument in the above paragraph shows that
q∗ maximizes both terms on the right-hand side of (5). Thus, if q˜ ∈ Q∗2(λ), then q˜ also
maximizes both terms on the right-hand side of (5). Because q˜ maximizes the first term,
q˜ satisfies (i) in the statement with probability one. Because q˜ maximizes the second term
(i.e., the value of the second term is zero) and Q˜i is nondecreasing, for each vi ∈ (0, 1),
if H(F (vi)) > G(F (vi)), then there must be a small neighborhood of vi in which Q˜i(x) is
constant. Thus, Q˜i is differentiable at vi and Q˜
′
i(vi) = 0. Therefore, q˜ satisfies (ii) in the
statement with probability one.
In Section 3, we defined the assignment function q∗ by (3). This function is shown to be a
solution to the problem P2(λ), but may not be the unique one. We show that q∗ achieves the
lowest expected surplus and revenue among all solutions to P2(λ), and introduce another
solution q∗∗ which is shown to achieve the highest expected surplus and revenue. Since
any convex combination of two solutions is also a solution to P2(λ), for any solution to
problem P2(λ), there exists a convex combination of q∗ and q∗∗ that achieves the same level
of expected surplus and revenue as that solution.
Recall that q∗ is the assignment function such that bunching occurs on each interval on
which ϕ¯ is constant. The next assignment function q∗∗ may not lead to bunching on the
entire region within such an interval. For each x ∈ [0, 1], let
b(x) = max{y ∈ [0, x] |H(F (y)) = G(F (y))},
b(x) = min{y ∈ [x, 1] |H(F (y)) = G(F (y))}.
Because G(0) = H(0), G(1) = H(1), and F,G,H are all continuous, the above maximum
and minimum always exist. By definition, b(x) ≤ b(x) for all x ∈ [0, 1], and b(x) = b(x) if
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and only if both are equal to x (or, equivalently, H(F (x)) = G(F (x))). For each x ∈ [0, 1],
let B(x) be either an open interval or a singleton defined by
B(x) =

(
b(x), b(x)
)
if b(x) < b(x),
{x} if b(x) = b(x).
If b(x) < b(x), then B(x) is the maximum open interval containing x such that H(F (y)) >
G(F (y)) for all y in the interval. By the definition of ϕ¯, for each x ∈ [0, 1], ϕ¯must be constant
on B(x). It is possible, however, that B(x) is not the maximal interval in which ϕ¯ is constant,
that is, ϕ¯ may take the same value on B(x) and B(x′) even when B(x)∩B(x′) = ∅. Let q∗∗
be defined by, for each i ∈ N and v ∈ [0, 1]n,
q∗∗i (v) =

1/ |{j ∈ N | vj ∈ B(maxk∈N vk)}| if vi ∈ B(maxk∈N vk),
0 otherwise.
(6)
This assignment function q∗∗ has the same property as q∗ whereby the object is assigned
to one of the agents with the largest value of ϕ¯(vi), but is different from q
∗ in that even if
i ∈ argmaxj∈N ϕ¯(vj), it is possible that i wins with probability zero. This occurs if there
exist j ∈ N with vi < vj and y ∈ (vi, vj) such that G(F (y)) = H(F (y)). In this case, even
if ϕ¯(vj) = ϕ¯(vi), then vi /∈ B(maxk∈N vk). Let Q∗∗i (vi) = Ev−i [q∗∗i (vi, v−i)] be the interim
assignment probability.
Proposition 10. For each λ > 0, both assignment functions q∗ and q∗∗ solve problem P2(λ).
Moreover, q∗ yields the minimum expected revenue and the minimum expected surplus among
Q∗2(λ), and q∗∗ yields the maximum expected revenue and the maximum expected surplus
among Q∗2(λ).
Proof. The proof is postponed to Appendix A.4.
Proposition 10 shows how we can choose the solution among Q∗2(λ) whose expected
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revenue equals the given revenue cap R ∈ (0, Re). Suppose that the expected revenues under
q∗ and q∗∗ are R∗ and R∗∗, respectively. Then Proposition 10 implies that Q∗2(λ(R)) =⋃
R′∈[R∗,R∗∗]Q∗1(R′). If R∗ = R∗∗, then any solution to problem P2(λ) yields the same level
of expected revenue, and Q∗1(R) = Q∗2(λ(R)). If R∗ < R∗∗ and R ∈ [R∗, R∗∗], then Q∗1(R) ⊊
Q∗2(λ(R)), and αq∗+(1−α)q∗∗ is a solution to problem P1(R), where α = (R∗∗−R)/(R∗∗−
R∗).
A.4 Proof of Proposition 10
It is obvious that q∗ and q∗∗ satisfy conditions (i) and (ii) in Proposition 9, and thus q∗, q∗∗ ∈
Q∗2(λ).
To clarify the dependence on λ, we denote ϕλ(x) = x−λψ(x) andHλ(p) =
∫ p
0
ϕλ(F
−1(p′)) dp′
for each λ > 0. Let Gλ(p) be the convex hull of Hλ(p), and let ϕ¯λ(x) = G
′
λ(F
−1(x)). We
now prove the following lemma.
Lemma 3. For each x, x′ ∈ [0, 1] with x < x′ and each λ¯ > 0: (i) if ϕ¯λ¯(x) = ϕ¯λ¯(x′), then
ϕ¯λ(x) = ϕ¯λ(x
′) for all λ ≥ λ¯; and (ii) if ϕ¯λ¯(x) < ϕ¯λ¯(x′), then there exists λˆ > λ¯ such that
ϕ¯λ(x) < ϕ¯λ(x
′) for all λ ∈ [λ¯, λˆ].
Proof of Lemma 3. Let x, x′ ∈ [0, 1] with x < x′ and λ¯ > 0. First we prove (i). Suppose
that ϕ¯λ(x) = ϕ¯λ¯(x
′). Equivalently, there exists a, b ∈ [0, 1] with a ≤ x < x′ ≤ b such that
for all y ∈ (a, b),
Hλ¯(F (y)) ≥ Hλ¯(F (a)) + (F (y)− F (a))
Hλ¯(F (b))−Hλ¯(F (a))
F (b)− F (a) .
Observe that for any λ ≥ λ¯,
1
λ
(
Hλ(F (y))−Hλ(F (a))− (F (y)− F (a))Hλ(F (b))−Hλ(F (a))
F (b)− F (a)
)
− 1
λ¯
(
Hλ¯(F (y))−Hλ¯(F (a))− (F (y)− F (a))
Hλ¯(F (b))−Hλ¯(F (a))
F (b)− F (a)
)
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=
(1
λ¯
− 1
λ
)(
(F (y)− F (a))
∫ b
a
wdF (w)
F (b)− F (a) −
∫ y
a
w dF (w)
)
=
(1
λ¯
− 1
λ
)((F (y)− F (a)) ∫ by wdF (w)
F (b)− F (a) −
(F (b)− F (y)) ∫ y
a
wdF (w)
F (b)− F (a)
)
≥ (1
λ¯
− 1
λ
)((F (y)− F (a))(F (b)− F (y))y
F (b)− F (a) −
(F (b)− F (y))(F (y)− F (a))y
F (b)− F (a)
)
= 0.
Therefore, for all y ∈ (a, b) and all λ ≥ λ¯ we obtain
Hλ(F (y)) ≥ Hλ(F (a)) + (F (y)− F (a))Hλ(F (b))−Hλ(F (a))
F (b)− F (a) ,
which implies that ϕ¯λ(x) = ϕ¯λ(x
′).
We now prove (ii). Suppose that ϕ¯λ¯(x) < ϕ¯λ¯(x
′). Equivalently, for any a, b ∈ [0, 1] with
a ≤ x < x′ ≤ b there exists y ∈ (a, b) such that
Hλ¯(F (y)) < Hλ¯(F (a)) + (F (y)− F (a))
Hλ¯(F (b))−Hλ¯(F (a))
F (b)− F (a) .
By the continuity of Hλ(F (a)), Hλ(F (b)) and Hλ(F (y)) in λ, there exists λˆ > λ¯ such that,
for all λ ∈ [λ¯, λˆ],
Hλ(F (y)) < Hλ(F (a)) + (F (y)− F (a))Hλ(F (b))−Hλ(F (a))
F (b)− F (a) .
Therefore, ϕ¯λ(x) < ϕ¯λ(x
′) for all λ ∈ [λ¯, λˆ].
Let q∗(·;λ) be the assignment function defined in (3). We show that q∗(·;λ) achieves the
minimum expected revenue for each λ > 0.
Let v ∈ [0, 1]n. Applying Lemma 3 for each pair of (x, x′) ∈ {v1, . . . , vn}2 with x < x′,
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we obtain λˆ > λ¯ such that for each i, j ∈ N and each λ ∈ [λ¯, λˆ],
ϕ¯λ¯(vi) ⋚ ϕ¯λ¯(vj) ⇐⇒ ϕ¯λ(vi) ⋚ ϕ¯λ(vj).
Hence, q∗(v;λ) gives the same assignment for all λ ∈ [λ¯, λˆ].
Applying this for each v ∈ [0, 1]n, we obtain pointwise convergence of∑i q∗i (v;λ)ψ(vi)f(v)
to
∑
i q
∗
i (v; λ¯)ψ(vi)f(v) as λ↘ λ¯. Because
∑
i q
∗
i (v;λ)ψ(vi)f(v) is bounded uniformly across
all v, by the dominated convergence theorem we have
Ev
[∑
i∈N
q∗i (v;λ)ψ(vi)
]
=
∫
v∈[0,1]n
∑
i∈N
q∗i (v;λ)ψ(vi)f(v)dv
→
∫
v∈[0,1]n
∑
i∈N
q∗i (v; λ¯)ψ(vi)f(v)dv (as λ↘ λ¯)
= Ev
[∑
i∈N
q∗i (v; λ¯)ψ(vi)
]
,
that is, the expected revenue under assignment function q∗(·;λ) converges to the expected
revenue under assignment function q∗(·; λ¯) as λ↘ λ¯.
Because λ(R) is a nonincreasing function, the limit of the expected revenue under q∗(·;λ)
as λ ↘ λ¯ is weakly less than the expected revenue under any q ∈ Q∗2(λ). This means that
the expected revenue under q∗ is minimum among all q ∈ Q∗2(λ).
We now prove the following lemma.
Lemma 4. For each λ¯ > 0: (i) for each x ∈ [0, 1], if Gλ¯(F (x)) = Hλ¯(F (x)), then
Gλ(F (x)) = Hλ(F (x)) for all λ ∈ (0, λ¯]; and (ii) for each x, x′ ∈ [0, 1] with x < x′, if
Gλ¯(F (y)) > Hλ¯(F (y)) for all y ∈ [x, x′], then there exists λˆ ∈ (0, λ¯) such that Gλ(F (y)) >
Hλ(F (y)) for all λ ∈ [λˆ, λ¯] and all y ∈ [x, x′].
Proof of Lemma 4. Let x ∈ [0, 1] and λ¯ > 0. We first prove (i). Suppose that Gλ¯(F (x)) =
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Hλ¯(F (x)). Equivalently, for any a, b ∈ [0, 1] with a < x < b,
Hλ¯(F (x)) ≤ Hλ¯(F (a)) + (F (x)− F (a))
Hλ¯(F (b))−Hλ¯(F (a))
F (b)− F (a) .
Observe that for any λ ∈ (0, λ¯],
1
λ
(
−Hλ(F (x)) +Hλ(F (a)) + (F (x)− F (a))Hλ(F (b))−Hλ(F (a))
F (b)− F (a)
)
− 1
λ¯
(
−Hλ¯(F (x)) +Hλ¯(F (a)) + (F (x)− F (a))
Hλ¯(F (b))−Hλ¯(F (a))
F (b)− F (a)
)
=
(1
λ
− 1
λ¯
)(
(F (x)− F (a))
∫ b
a
wdF (w)
F (b)− F (a) −
∫ x
a
w dF (w)
)
=
(1
λ
− 1
λ¯
)((F (x)− F (a)) ∫ b
x
wdF (w)
F (b)− F (a) −
(F (b)− F (x)) ∫ x
a
wdF (w)
F (b)− F (a)
)
≥ (1
λ
− 1
λ¯
)((F (x)− F (a))(F (b)− F (x))x
F (b)− F (a) −
(F (b)− F (x))(F (x)− F (a))x
F (b)− F (a)
)
= 0.
Therefore, for all x ∈ (a, b) and all λ ∈ (0, λ¯], we obtain
Hλ(F (y)) ≤ Hλ(F (a)) + (F (y)− F (a))Hλ(F (b))−Hλ(F (a))
F (b)− F (a) ,
which implies that Gλ(F (x)) = Hλ(F (x)).
Now we prove (ii). Suppose that Gλ¯(F (y)) > Hλ¯(F (y)) for all y ∈ [x, x′]. Equivalently,
there exists a, b ∈ [0, 1] such that a ≤ x < x′ ≤ b, and for all y ∈ [x, x′],
Hλ¯(F (y)) > Hλ¯(F (a)) + (F (y)− F (a))
Hλ¯(F (b))−Hλ¯(F (a))
F (b)− F (a) .
By the continuity of Hλ(F (a)), Hλ(F (b)) and Hλ(F (x)) in λ, there exists λˆ ∈ (0, λ¯] such
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that, for all y ∈ [x, x′] and all λ ∈ [λˆ, λ¯],
Hλ(F (y)) > Hλ(F (a)) + (F (y)− F (a))Hλ(F (b))−Hλ(F (a))
F (b)− F (a) .
Therefore, Gλ(F (y)) > Hλ(F (y)) for all y ∈ [x, x′] and all λ ∈ [λˆ, λ¯].
Let q∗∗(·;λ) be the assignment function defined in (6). We show that q∗∗(·;λ) achieves
the maximum expected revenue for each λ > 0.
Applying Lemma 4 for each x, x′ ∈ [0, 1] with x < x′, there exists λˆ ∈ (0, λ¯) such that
for each λ ∈ [λˆ, λ¯],
Gλ¯(y) > Hλ¯(y) for all y ∈ [x, x′] ⇐⇒ Gλ(y) > Hλ(y) for all y ∈ [x, x′].
Thus, for each v ∈ [0, 1]n there exists λˆ ∈ (0, λ¯) such that for each i, j ∈ N and each
λ ∈ [λˆ, λ¯],
Bλ¯(vi) = Bλ¯(vj) ⇐⇒ Bλ(vi) = Bλ(vj),
where for each λ, Bλ(x) is the set B(x) introduced before the definition of q
∗∗. Hence, for
each v ∈ [0, 1]n, q∗∗(v;λ) gives the same assignment for all λ ∈ [λˆ, λ¯].
Applying this, for each v ∈ [0, 1] we obtain pointwise convergence of∑i q∗∗i (v;λ)ψ(vi)f(v)
to
∑
i q
∗∗
i (v; λ¯)ψ(vi)f(v) as λ ↗ λ¯. Because
∑
i q
∗∗
i (v;λ)ψ(vi)f(v) is bounded uniformly
across all v, by the dominated convergence theorem,
Ev
[∑
i∈N
q∗∗i (v;λ)ψ(vi)
]
=
∫
v∈[0,1]n
∑
i∈N
q∗∗i (v;λ)ψ(vi)f(v)dv
→
∫
v∈[0,1]n
∑
i∈N
q∗∗i (v; λ¯)ψ(vi)f(v)dv (as λ↗ λ¯)
= Ev
[∑
i∈N
q∗∗i (v; λ¯)ψ(vi)
]
,
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that is, the expected revenue under assignment function q∗∗(·;λ) converges to the expected
revenue under assignment function q∗∗(·; λ¯) as λ↗ λ¯.
Because λ(R) is a nonincreasing function, the limit of the expected revenues under
q∗∗(·;λ) as λ ↗ λ¯ is weakly greater than the expected revenue under any q ∈ Q∗2(λ). This
means that the expected revenue under q∗∗ is maximum among all q ∈ Q∗2(λ).
A.5 Proofs of propositions in Section 3.1
Proof of Proposition 2. By Proposition 1, if q ∈ Q∗1(R), then q ∈ Q∗2(λ(R)). The statement
is a direct implication of (i) in Proposition 9.
Proof of Proposition 3. Let λ = λ(R). If Q∗i (vi) is not constant in any open interval, then
Q∗i (vi) is strictly increasing by interim monotonicity. Then the definition of q
∗ implies that
ϕ¯(x) is strictly increasing. In this case, the auction given by q∗ is the same as the second-
price auction that leads to efficiency. This contradicts R < Re. Therefore Q∗i (vi) is constant
in some open interval.
Proof of Proposition 4. To clarify the dependence on λ, we denote ϕλ(x) = x − λψ(x) and
Hλ(p) =
∫ p
0
ϕλ(F
−1(p′)) dp′ for each λ > 0. Let Gλ(p) be the convex hull of Hλ(p), and let
ϕ¯λ(x) = G
′
λ(F
−1(x)).
By Proposition 1, q ∈ Q∗2(λ(R)). By Lemma 3 (i) in Appendix A.4, for each x, x′ ∈ [0, 1]
and each λ˜ ≥ λ(R), ϕ¯λ(R)(x) = ϕ¯λ(R)(x′) implies that ϕ¯λ˜(x) = ϕ¯λ˜(x′). Therefore, for each
i ∈ N , if Q∗i (vi) is constant on (a, b), then Q˜∗i (vi) is also constant on (a, b).
We note that an analogous argument shows that Q∗∗i (vi) is constant in some interval. In
fact, if Q∗∗i (vi) is strictly increasing, then H(F (x)) = G(F (x)) for almost all x by Propo-
sition 9 (ii). This implies that B(x) = {x} for almost all x, and thus q∗∗ agrees with the
efficient assignment function almost everywhere, contradicting R < Re.
Proof of Proposition 5. First, observe that ϕ′(1) = 1− 2λ. Thus, if λ > 1/2, then ϕ′(1) < 0.
Because we assume the continuous differentiability of f , ϕ′ is continuous. Thus, there exists
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w < 1 such that ϕ′(x) < 0 for all x ∈ (w, 1). On the interval (F (w), 1), we have H ′′(p) =
ϕ′(F−1(p))dF
−1(p)
dp
< 0, and hence H(p)−G(p) > 0. By Proposition 9 (ii), Qi(x) is constant
for all x ∈ (w, 1) and all i ∈ N .
Suppose that there exists j ∈ N such that limvj↗1Qj(vj) = 1. Then Qj(x) = 1 for all
x ∈ (w, 1), that is, if vj ∈ (w, 1), then qj(vj, v−j) = 1 for almost all v−j ∈ [0, 1]n−1. In
particular, qi(v) = 0 for all i ̸= j and almost all v ∈ (w, 1)n. This implies that for all i ̸= j
and almost all vi ∈ (w, 1), Qi(vi) ≤ F (w) < 1, and thus limvi↗1Qi(vi) is lower than 1.
If q is symmetric, for all i ∈ N and all vi ∈ (w, 1), Qi(vi) ≤ (1 + (n − 1)F (w))/n < 1,
and thus limvi↗1Qi(vi) is lower than 1.
Proof of Proposition 6. Suppose that the hazard rate f(x)
1−F (x) is nondecreasing. We note that
the hazard rate is constant if and only if F is the exponential distribution, whose support
is [0,∞). Since we assume the finite support [0, 1] of the value distribution, the hazard rate
cannot be constant. Therefore, we have 1−F (0)
f(0)
> 1−F (1)
f(1)
.
For all x ∈ [0, 1],
H(F (x)) =
∫ x
0
(
y − λψ(y))dF (y)
=
∫ x
0
(
−(λ− 1)y + λ1− F (y)
f(y)
)
dF (y).
Suppose that λ ≥ 1. Then, since 1−F (y)
f(y)
is nonincreasing and 1−F (0)
f(0)
> 1−F (1)
f(1)
, H is concave
and (1 − p)H(0) + pH(1) < H(p) for each p ∈ (0, 1). Since H(0) = 0, the convex hull is
given by G(p) = pH(1) < H(p) for each p ∈ (0, 1). By the condition (ii) of Proposition 9, if
Qi is the interim assignment probability in a solution to problem P2(λ), Q′i(vi) = 0 for each
i ∈ N and almost every vi ∈ (0, 1). By Lemma 1, this implies that the expected revenue is
zero, contradicting the assumption of R > 0. Hence, we have λ < 1.
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A.6 Proofs of propositions in Section 3.2
Proof of Proposition 7. We first show that λ = λ(R) ≥ 1/2. Assume that λ < 1/2. Because
ϕ′(1) = 1 − 2λ > 0, the concavity of ϕ implies that ϕ′(x) > 0 for all x ∈ [0, 1], that is,
ϕ is strictly increasing. Thus, ϕ¯ is also strictly increasing. Proposition 9 implies that the
expected revenue equals Re. This contradicts the assumption R < Re.
We now show that q∗ is a solution for some w¯ ∈ (0, 1). By the concavity of ϕ, there
exists w ∈ [0, 1] such that ϕ is nondecreasing on [0, w] and nonincreasing on [w, 1]. Then
H(p) =
∫ p
0
ϕ(F−1(p′)) dp′ is convex on [0, F (w)] and concave on [F (w), 1]. This implies that
there exists w¯ ∈ [0, 1] such that ϕ¯ is strictly increasing on [0, w¯) and constant on [w¯, 1]. We
show that w¯ ≠ 0 or 1. If w¯ = 0, the expected revenue equals Re. If w¯ = 1, the expected
revenue is zero. By Proposition 10, q∗ takes the form in the statement.
Proof of Proposition 8. We first show that λ = λ(R) ≤ 1/2. Assume that λ > 1/2. Because
ϕ′(1) = 1 − 2λ < 0, the convexity of ϕ implies that ϕ′(x) < 0 for all x ∈ [0, 1]. Thus, ϕ¯ is
constant on [0, 1]. Proposition 9 implies that the expected revenue equals 0. This contradicts
the assumption R > 0.
We now show that q∗ is a solution for some w ∈ (0, 1). By the convexity of ϕ, there
exists w ∈ [0, 1] such that H(p) = ∫ p
0
ϕ(F−1(p′)) dp′ is concave on [0, F (w)], and convex on
[F (w), 1]. This implies that there exists w ∈ [0, 1] such that ϕ¯ is constant on [0, w] and
strictly increasing on (w, 1]. By Proposition 10, q∗ takes the form in the statement.
Finally, we show that w ̸= 0 or 1. If w = 0, the expected revenue equals Re. If w = 1,
the expected revenue is zero. Both contradict the assumption R ∈ (0, Re).
A.7 Relationship between P1(R) and P2(λ) in convex/concave cases
As informally discussed in the Introduction, problem P1(R) involving surplus maximization
subject to a revenue cap is related to the maximization of a weighted sum of the expected
revenue and buyers’ payoffs according to P2(λ). We now discuss connections between these
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λ¯ = 0.549λ = 0.5
R
e = 0.297
0.204
Figure 6: Relationship between λ and R under the standard normal distribution truncated
on [0, 1].
problems.
In Proposition 1, we proved that for each R ∈ (0, Re) there exists a unique λ(R) > 0
satisfying Q∗1(R) ⊆ Q∗2(λ(R)). In general, the converse is not true. In Section 3.2.3, we
observed a special case in which problem P2(λ) has multiple solutions that lead to multiple
levels of the expected revenue. We now present another example in whichQ∗1(R) ⊊ Q∗2(λ(R))
holds true.
Example 6. Suppose that for each x ∈ [0, 1], f(x) = e−x2/2/Γ, where Γ = ∫ 1
0
e−x
2/2 dx.
This is the density function for the truncated standard normal distribution defined on [0, 1].
Numerical computation gives Figure 6, which shows the relationship between λ and R.
If λ ≤ 1/2 (=: λ), the essentially unique solution to problem P2(λ) is the efficient assign-
ment function, which leads to an expected revenue of Re = 0.297. If λ < λ < λ¯ := 0.549,
the expected revenue in the solutions to problem P2(λ) is unique and strictly decreasing in
λ. If λ = λ¯, problem P2(λ) has solutions that lead to multiple levels of expected revenues:
R = 0.204 under the assignment function q∗∗ defined in (6), and R = 0 under the assignment
function q∗ defined in (3). Conversely, λ(R) is constant on (0, 0.204] and strictly decreasing
on (0.204, Re).
We roughly explain this behavior of λ(R). Under this distribution, there exists x¯ ∈ (0, 1)
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such that the virtual value function ψ is strictly convex on (0, x¯), and strictly concave on
(x¯, 1). Since ψ′(0) = ψ′(1) = 2 in this specific case, (ψ(y) − ψ(x))/(y − x) < 2 for all
0 ≤ x < y ≤ 1. By the “shadow price” argument, the solution of P2(λ) with λ ≤ 1/2
is the efficient assignment function. For λ ∈ (1/2, λ¯), bunching occurs in the region with
larger values of ψ′. Because ψ′(x) is larger when x is close to 0 or close to 1, there exists
0 < w < w < 1 such that the interim assignment probability Q∗i (vi) is constant on (0, w) and
on (w, 1). As λ increases, w increases and w decreases. These changes make the bunching
region larger and the expected revenue smaller. Eventually, w and w coincide when λ reaches
some value λ¯. In this limit as λ ↗ λ¯, the assignment function converges to q∗∗ defined in
(6), under which Q∗∗i (vi) is constant on the two intervals and discontinuous at vi = w = w.
Conversely, it can be shown that (ψ(y)− ψ(x))/(y − x) > 1/λ¯ for almost all 0 ≤ x < y ≤ 1.
This implies that if λ = λ¯, then ϕ¯(x) is constant on [0, 1]. Thus, q∗ defined in (3) is constant
on the entire domain, and leads to an expected revenue of zero.
The argument in this example suggests that multiplicity of the expected revenue may
arise if there exists 0 ≤ a < b < c ≤ 1 such that ψ is strictly convex on (a, b), and strictly
concave on (b, c). We can show that revenue uniqueness holds in other special cases discussed
in Sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2.
Proposition 11. Suppose that R ∈ (0, Re). If ψ is either strictly convex or strictly concave,
any solution q ∈ Q∗2(λ(R)) yields expected revenue equal to R, and therefore, Q∗1(R) =
Q∗2(λ(R)) for all R ∈ (0, Re).
Proof. Let λ = λ(R). Suppose that ψ is strictly convex. By the strict concavity of ϕ,
there exists w ∈ [0, 1] such that ϕ is strictly increasing on (0, w), and strictly decreasing on
(w, 1). ThenH(p) =
∫ p
0
ϕ(F−1(p′)) dp′ is strictly convex on (0, F (w)), and strictly concave on
(F (w), 1). This implies that there exists unique w¯ ∈ [0, w) such that ϕ¯ is strictly increasing
on [0, w¯), and constant on [w¯, 1]. In addition, we have H(F (x)) > G(F (x)) for all x ∈ (w¯, 1).
Therefore, q∗ = q∗∗ by Proposition 9. By Proposition 10, the expected revenue for solutions
in Q∗2(λ(R)) is unique.
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The case with strictly concave ψ can be shown similarly.
Proposition 11 may be interpreted as a type of revenue-equivalence result, although there
is an important difference. The standard revenue equivalence claims that any pair of two
mechanisms having interim-equivalent assignment functions yield the same expected revenue.
This result here implies that even if the assignment functions are not assume to be interim-
equivalent to each other, these assignment functions should coincide, and thus all solutions
yield the same expected revenue as long as they share the same objective. In fact, the
proof shows that when ψ is either strictly convex or strictly concave, the interim assignment
probability is essentially unique (i.e. q∗ = q∗∗), and the expected revenue and the expected
surplus are also unique because of the standard revenue equivalence.
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